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Panelists: David Atkinson, Douglas Burig, Marc Canellas, and Alan Wagner 
 
Anne Toomey  
McKenna:  We have had some general conversations 
today. In this panel, besides trying to make sure 
that we wake you up since you just ate lunch, 
we are going to really try to give some more 
specific examples. One of the things that I 
want you to understand is how exciting it is to 
have these experts here. They bring a different 
focus than some of what we have been hearing 
from today. We have a wide array of people 
today, but we are going to be focusing on 
autonomous systems in domestic society and 
autonomous systems from a domestic security 
perspective. 
 
I am very excited to welcome here today, to 
Penn State, the panelists we have. First, sitting 
next to me, or right beside me, is Dr. David 
Atkinson. He is the head of systems and 
technology, and he is the chief research 
scientist for artificial intelligence (AI) at 
Continental Silicon Valley Research and 
Development Center. He oversees systems and 
technology projects for future transportation 
and mobility systems with a focus on intelligent 
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driver assistance, autonomous vehicles and 
smart cities. He has worked at the Florida 
Institute for Human and Machine Cognition, 
leading research projects and trustworthiness 
on autonomous robotic systems. He has 
previously worked for twenty years with 
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Cal-
Tech, and he was a founder of NASA’s 
artificial intelligence program. Dr. Atkinson 
has made significant contributions; and he 
continues to, in the world of autonomous 
vehicles, be a pioneering thought leader. He 
has dual degrees from Yale University: a Master 
of Science degree and a Master of Philosophy 
degree. The focus of his degrees are computer 
science and artificial intelligence. So, we are 
very happy to have him here. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Sitting next to him is Professor Alan Wagner, 
Penn State’s own. He is from our Department 
of Aerospace Engineering, and he is a Research 
Associate with our Rock Ethics Institute. He 
received his PhD from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology. Dr. Wagner researches and 
develops techniques that allow robots to 
interact with people in a variety of different 
social contexts. If you ever look at the Penn 
State News Day Today feed, he is in there, I 
feel like every week, for the fascinating work he 
is doing. That, or that he is a really good 
communications director. He is investigating 
deception, human robot trust and the 
conditions which encourage people or 
discourage people from trusting robots. He is 
also—this is I think, particularly fascinating 
considering—researching robots that can 
evaluate whether or not they should trust 
people. 
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Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Dr. Wagner’s research has won numerous 
awards. His research on deception has had 
significant notoriety in the media. Not just 
Penn State, but the Wall Street Journal, New 
Scientist magazine, Journal of Science, and his 
work was described by Time Magazine as the 
thirteenth most important invention. Again, he 
holds numerous accolades and awards to his 
credit, and he holds a Master’s degree in 
Computer Science from Boston University and 
an undergraduate degree in psychology from 
Northwestern University in addition to his 
PhD. Then, I’m going to jump over you for a 
second there. 
 
Marc Canellas:   I’m just the odd one out. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  And so, we’ll come back to that in a minute. 
Next, we have Major Douglas (Doug) Burig, 
who is a Major here with our Pennsylvania 
State Police. There are really very few Majors if 
you’re unfamiliar with the ranking of that 
system. There are over six thousand officers 
employed with the Pennsylvania State Police, 
and only eleven of those are Majors. He is the 
overall director for the Pennsylvania State 
Police’s Bureau of Criminal Investigation, and 
that falls under the umbrella of the Bureau of 
Criminal Investigation. His background: he has 
served for over two decades as an officer, 
including the Commander of the Analytical 
Intelligence section, as he brings up while 
talking with him at lunch. He worked his way 
up through the ranks. His experience in 
analytics and use of predictive abilities really 
bring us a lot of information here today. He has 
a BA in Political Science, and he holds a 
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Masters in Science degree in Administration of 
Justice and Homeland Security. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Then sitting in between, we have a 1L. We have 
Dr. Marc Canellas. While he is a JD student at 
NYU School of Law, he is also NYU’s 
Jacobsen Leadership Program in Law and 
Business Scholar and Cybersecurity Service 
Scholar. His current legal tech research focuses 
on technological civil rights movements, the 
use of predictive policing, and biometrics 
including face recognition. 
 
 Again, Dr. Canellas, though while he may be a 
law student now, his CV is remarkable. He has 
a PhD in Aerospace and Cognitive 
Engineering from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, where he studied human decision 
making and human machine interaction. His 
postdoctoral research at the Cognitive 
Engineering Center at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology’s School of Aerospace 
Engineering involved mathematical 
computation and human subject studies 
towards developing decision support tools for 
military command. He’s a voting member of 
the IEEE-USA Artificial Intelligence and 
Autonomous Systems Policy Committee. He 
has served as an IEEE Congressional Science 
and Technology Fellow in the United States 
House of Representatives where he was 
responsible for legislation, appropriations and 
media for aerospace, cyber security, privacy 
and surveillance science, technology, AI, 
robotics. His research has already been 
published in numerous journals, in media 
outlets, national security outlets, and he has 
won awards from the National Science 
Foundation and the Max Planck Institute for 
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Human Development in Berlin. He earned his 
BS in Mechanical Engineering from the 
University of Missouri, and his Masters of 
Science and PhD in Aerospace Engineering 
from Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  I already said today we are going to be talking 
about domestic systems, and what a range of 
people to have bring this to us. And we are 
going to get really specific about it. But I want 
to set the stage because we have had some 
theoretical discussions and we really want to 
break this down today in very concrete, real 
examples of how technology, law, autonomous 
systems, and what is really happening and what 
we think of this. We have challenges in this 
question about, what, really, from the domestic 
standpoint, is not a theoretical or a 
philosophical standpoint, but a domestic 
standpoint: what is the law? And we are talking 
about this. And so, there’ are several problems 
that focus on this. One is definition-based, one 
is knowledge-based, and then there is reality-
based. 
 
  We keep hearing these terms, “autonomous 
systems” today, and we have heard some very 
extreme examples from autonomous systems 
and weapons. We have heard just the potential. 
A lot of debate that has been very provocative 
and thought provoking. But when we say 
“autonomous systems” from a legal 
standpoint, what does that mean? Your phone 
is loaded with autonomous systems. Are we 
talking about Skynet? Are we talking about 
Alexa? What are we talking about when we talk 
about autonomous systems?  Part of our 
problem and the challenges in this is 
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knowledge-based: do consumers, policymakers 
and lawyers even understand AI? Do they 
understand autonomous systems? And then, 
this other part is reality-based. Again, we keep 
hearing theoretical conversations. But AI and 
autonomous systems are pervasive now. They 
are what you do on a daily basis. We did hear 
some great examples about—I think it was 
General Dunlap—”I go the way it tells me to 
go.” That is autonomous systems controlling 
your present-day behavior, designing and 
controlling how you interact with the world. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  We continue to see, though, just the concept of 
autonomous systems and domestic society are 
not regulated in the way that the concepts of 
military use of autonomous systems may or 
may not be regulated. But that is where we tend 
to see the technological advances that are 
changing and shaping all of our lives. 
 
 When we look at this, we are going to talk 
about systems, both the design and the data 
that is collected. But then, how this data is 
actually aggregated? How it is used? How it is 
used by police? How it is used by researchers? 
And so, we’re going to be trying to keep this 
concept of “private sector” in action and 
impact on these broader questions of civil 
liberty. Part of the problem when we talk about 
law and autonomous systems is: what laws 
regulate autonomous systems? What regulates 
AI? We have this crazy patchwork of laws and 
a sectoral approach in the US that makes it very 
challenging to explain this to someone not 
steeped in the technology or law in this area. 
And so I have highlighted the regulatory 
agencies in these giant bubbles. We are pulling 
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from multiple sources of law that may or may 
not influence, or control, or regulate 
autonomous systems. But I want to focus to 
give you an example on that regulatory 
agencies for a minute. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Autonomous systems in the US, again, are 
sector-based and state-based. When we talk 
about autonomous cars, like self-driving 
vehicles, well, we are talking about the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration that is 
producing regulation and mandates – 
legislative mandates that embed AI technology 
in every vehicle in the United States by federal 
law – and the goal is to get to the point of 
communication to vehicle to vehicle 
communication. If we want to talk about 
UAVs, which somebody will touch on today, it 
is the Federal Aviation Administration. If you 
want to talk about websites and online activity 
and algorithms that are controlling what you 
see or do not see on websites, that is the FTC, 
the Federal Trade Commission. 
 
 Just as a quick overview, we also have our 
federal laws and our state laws: part of the 
problem in this. Then before I turn it over to 
these, my esteemed colleagues here, this is 
really timely. Yesterday on the NPR driving up 
here, Ralph Nader is on this. So, in the most 
recent Boeing crash, Ralph Nader’s grandniece 
was killed. It was a twenty-four-year-old 
woman, and Ralph Nader is a consumer 
advocate. This quote, though, I think really 
frames almost everything we’ve heard today in 
these panels, and what we heard last night from 
Paul. So, this is a harbinger talking about this 
crash, medical technology, autonomous 
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weapons, self-driving cars. “It’s the arrogance 
of the algorithms, not augmenting human 
intelligence, but overriding it and replacing it.” 
The significance of this Boeing disaster is that 
it can teach us some very important lessons 
about maintaining human intelligence, and not 
seeding it autonomous to systems that have no 
moral base and intuition. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna: With that, I am going to turn this over to David 
Atkinson. Again, he is one of the country’s 
leading . . . 
 
David Atkinson:  Oh, stop. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Okay, sorry. He is really cool. But I just want 
to set the stage for us with an overview of AI 
supported autonomous systems, how they 
function in domestic society and their 
increasing use. I actually hope you can also just 
loop in that 5G point as that is changing. 
 
David Atkinson:  I will. Yes. Thank you very much. 
Yeah, okay. Thank you very much, and 
sometimes it is hard to continue on a Friday 
afternoon after lunch, and I appreciate you 
being here. I realized part of my challenge is to 
stimulate you for the remaining part of the 
symposium, and we will see how many heads 
go down and give me some real-time feedback. 
 I published my first paper on autonomous 
robotics in 1984. In retrospect, it is a terrible 
paper. But it tells you that I have been thinking 
about this for a very long time, and my career 
has been devoted in various positions to 
autonomous systems in one form or another. 
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A very long time with NASA JPL and deep 
space exploration, working for the Air Force, 
doing my own research, and lots of other work 
for NASA, and now was time to go do 
something that would take all that interesting 
work that I was aware of, and that I could do, 
and infuse it into the Society for some social 
benefit. 
David Atkinson:  There were lots of different ways of doing that, 
and I chose automotive. Because if you look in 
the parking lot, every one of those cars has 
parts. My company, Continental, makes most 
of those parts. I think the only thing we don’t 
make is a steering wheel, but you don’t need 
that for that for an autonomous vehicle 
anyway. I’m going to keep this really reality-
based. 
 I am prone to going off in technology 
speculation sometimes, and forward casting, 
vision casting. But my job here is to tell you 
what is. What is the current state of things? 
And I am going to talk to you about it from the 
point of view of commercial products. Not 
from what’s running in the laboratory, but 
what is real today. 
 One exciting part of the job that I do is I get to 
go visit the companies that buy stuff from us: 
all the OEMs, FORD, GM. I am not going to 
name them all, but those companies that use 
the parts and so I can see what they are doing 
in the state of autonomous vehicles. I go visit 
startups, of which there are many in Silicon 
Valley, and see what they’re doing. And so, I 
have accumulated this pretty nice overview, I 
think, that gives me a chance to share this 
information now with you. 
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David Atkinson:  First thing to realize, you interact with 
intelligent systems every day, if you use a credit 
card, if you use a travel agent, if you—well, lots 
of things. Just trust me on this. They’ve been 
deployed since 1990s. Now, the important 
thing to remember is that there are lots of 
different aspects to artificial intelligence. And 
so, at different times in the history of AI, 
certain tools and techniques have become 
prominent, and other times faded. Parts of AI 
have—people will no longer even think of AI. 
 Object-oriented programming, which is a 
conventional part of programming languages, 
was originally invented by a researcher named 
Hewitt to support his work on agents and 
actors: the Actor Model. And other computer 
scientists said, “Oh, that is really interesting. 
I’m going to program my stuff in it. Doesn’t 
have anything to do with AI.” AI people want 
to know what intelligence is, so that was a 
programming language. We peel the onion off, 
threw that layer away, and we go to the next 
level. So AI, in a lot of ways, is advanced 
computer science. It’s also mostly about 
algorithms, and not entirely. 
 Here’s another thing to realize. Sometimes 
people equate Deep Learning and 
Connectionist learning – network-type learning 
– with AI. That is it, it was a relatively new 
development. Those are a relatively small part 
of the toolbox of artificial intelligence. It is 
working really well, surprisingly well, from my 
point of view. But it is not as mature as other 
areas. So, there is a large toolbox to draw on. I 
would refer to these Deep Learning techniques 
as “Connectionist” or data-driven. 
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David Atkinson:  Then there is the alternative approach or 
complementary approach, which is semantic, 
conceptually-driven techniques that used to 
drive the portion of AI that was referred to as 
“expert systems” (an unfortunate name). I 
really want to be careful about not giving false 
expectations by giving things names like 
“deep” and “learning” and “expert.” It is not 
that. It is computers. 
 So, intelligent systems may or may not be 
autonomous. They gain the ability to choose 
with autonomy, as I will show you in a minute. 
When they do, they can augment, multiply or 
replace human efforts. So we have in there the 
human augmentation model. We have the 
human multiplication, labor multiplication, and 
then replacement. Replacement, or 
substitution, is not the right way to think about 
it, and I will tell you more about that in a 
moment. 
  In conventional software, the programmer 
makes a decision on the sequence of how the 
program works. Maybe with some branching 
stuff, but it’s well-defined in advance. One of 
the key features of AI software and particularly 
autonomy, is that you push that decision of 
what to do out to run-time because that’s 
where you have a lot of uncertainty, and you 
do not know what the right sequence of things 
to do is. So, you make that choice from a 
limited number of predefined options. That is 
fine. It is still deterministic, but you do not 
decide until you actually have to. 
David Atkinson:  Autonomous machines perceive, interpret, 
decide, plan, and they act without the need for 
direct control. “Autonomy” is a word with a lot 
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of baggage these days, and we have already 
heard lots of definitions. So, I get to give you 
mine. It reflects the machines’ relative 
independence and control authority, which 
means it has been delegated the ability to do 
something, to perceive some goal, to pursue 
some goal within some constraints subject to 
certain levels of monitoring. But it is always 
contextual, and it is always with respect to 
whoever owned that control authority before. 
David Atkinson:  I was asked the question, “Will this all be 
disruptive?” Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Was this 
super computer in my pocket disruptive? I can 
get to any knowledge in the world anytime. 
Yeah, it has changed the world in a lot of 
positive ways. So when we are talking about 
autonomous systems, now they can act in more 
sophisticated, increasingly intelligent ways. In 
fact, now have wheels and can go places, or 
have arms and robots. Okay, yeah, we are going 
to see massive disruption. Important to note, 
this is why substitution is not the right way to 
think about this either. 
 In almost all cases of the introduction of 
automation into an existing system, there are 
ripple effects. In any organization, there is 
workflow, there are communications, there are 
levels of responsibility. This gets touched by 
the introduction of automation. The 
introduction of autonomous systems with 
decision-making capability adds another level 
of disruption to it. So you have to consider 
autonomy in this larger systems context, and 
that is part of what causes the disruption. 
David Atkinson:  How am I doing? Fine? Okay. So what is the 
real story about autonomous vehicles. I am 
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telling you the truth, first-hand knowledge of 
emerging mobility companies, my experience. 
I really worked hard to make this true. So, there 
you go. Trust my authority. 
David Atkinson:  So the component capabilities for autonomy 
such as perception are maturing, and very 
rapidly, and they are driving incremental 
deployment of the elements of autonomous 
systems, such as driver assistance. And you 
could buy these today. In new cars, you can 
spend the money, and you can get lane-
keeping, and you can get highway cruise 
control. 
 Around this subject of autonomous mobility, 
we see that the evolution of an ecosystem of 
companies now. There are lots of different 
stakeholders who can find value in this for 
different ways, but they have shared vision. 
And now these companies are partnering up. 
We see a multiplication of components 
suppliers, the services that are needed for, what 
five years ago, would have been a very absurd 
part of artificial intelligence, now with 
thousands of people working. And what is 
really important is that there is enabling 
infrastructure being put in place, a high-speed 
communication, 5G networks. 
 5G is fast enough, so now you can just start 
distributing computation from one computer 
to another effectively. And cloud computing is 
there, which means there is the potential for a 
lot of sharing in the information. Today, there 
are probably—I don’t know the exact number, 
but oh, well—over one thousand autonomous 
vehicles on the street in the US, in Europe, and 
also in Asia. 
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David Atkinson:  When you see pictures of these on the news, 
they show you the ones that really look weird, 
with the swirling LIDAR is on the top and the 
racks that go, “Oh, nobody would ever buy 
that car.” It’s like this is a test. Most 
autonomous vehicles look like ordinary cars. 
The ones I work with, and then Continental’s 
Chrysler 300s, they are black. We have lots of 
them. I mean, so they might stick out that way. 
But otherwise, from the outside, they look like 
ordinary cars. And that’s what you will buy 
when they are available. 
 Here are some examples and my forecasts, and 
in a couple of years, you can call me up and say, 
“You were smart.” Or, “Boy, were you dumb.” 
Driver Assistance, as I mentioned, you can buy 
that now. App-based are now rolling out, like 
Uber and Waymo, and they are moving very 
fast. They are in one or two cities now. But I 
know from being in the inside that they have 
very aggressive growth plans. In another year, 
you are going to go, “whoa.” 
 Self-parking–this is the part I love. How much 
time do you spend parking? A lot. Looking for 
a parking space. How would you like to roll up 
to your destination, get out of the car, and say 
“go park yourself?” And the car goes off, and 
finds a parking spot and parks. Then when you 
are done, you come out, and you go, “Pick me 
up.” And it comes, and it picks you up. 
David Atkinson:  And then it works. I am not saying it is perfect. 
I am not saying it is perfect yet. Parallel parking 
is hard for everybody, even for these cars. But 
it does work, and companies are buying this 
now. It is going to show up as an option in one 
or two years in cars you can buy. 
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David Atkinson:  Trailer hitching. I do not know how many 
people pull a trailer. But trailer hitching is 
difficult, and parking a trailer is really difficult. 
Technology exists. It is in advanced 
development. 
 Long-haul trucking. These are those big trucks 
on the highways that go far, across the western 
states, straight shot. These autonomous trucks 
are very advanced right now. I have seen them 
perform in what I think were very difficult 
circumstances. They are hauling freight. They 
are in pilot use by companies right now. And 
we will see in the next two years growth in that 
to hundreds and then thousands of trucks. 
Right now, they have safety drivers, but there 
is no need. I have seen a bunch of demos with 
them. I have followed in chase cars. The safety 
driver never touches anything. Not from 
parking lot to parking lot. These are big, huge 
trucks and they work great. 
David Atkinson:  Now, that is a limited domain, and you can 
make a lot of assumptions. And the company 
that provides this has made a lot of 
assumptions, but it works. Here’s something I 
want you to think about. This is getting into 
smart city now and tying into the infrastructure 
question, intelligent intersections and traffic 
control. So, this is a converging interest topic. 
The cities want to reduce congestion, they want 
to improve throughput, they want to get 
workers from outside in and inside out very 
quickly. And we have a technology now. We 
have a pilot installation in Walnut Creek of 
cameras and radars that get a complete 360-
degree view of all the cars, pedestrians, and 
builds a model of the world. It watches where 
an incoming car may be coming and cannot see 
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a pedestrian, because there is a visibility 
problem. It sends a message to the car saying 
“There is a pedestrian you can’t see.” This uses 
the European DSRC communications, which 
we don’t have in the US yet but it is the kind of 
technology that is coming. In fact, we have 
demonstrated the ability to automatically brake 
the car so it doesn’t hit the pedestrian. This is 
important. 
David Atkinson:  Intersections for pedestrians are the most 
dangerous place to be. That is where a huge 
number of accidents occur. If we have just 
solved that part, then we have made a huge 
dent in the safety problem. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:   And I have to make a dent. 
 
David Atkinson:  Yes, I am going fast now. Okay, what about my 
car? Because it is such a complex environment, 
and you want to use it. And if you are saying, 
“I have taken a craftsman wrench and tried to 
pound a nail with it.” That is not what the 
wrench was intended to do, but it works. 
People do this routinely. They use technology 
in ways that are not intended, but this is 
dangerous. So if you use this outside of the 
domain in which it was designed for, it is going 
to cause a problem. 
David Atkinson:  Now let’s put this all together on the last slide. 
As AI increases in capability and controls more 
and more systems, and interacts, it will become 
an increasingly attractive target for bad actors. 
Unfortunately, autonomous systems based on 
artificial intelligence are vulnerable to unique 
new attacks. Not to cyber-attacks as we know 
them today, but new ones on various aspects 
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of the system. And it is quite a difficult, real 
situation. There are dozens of attacks 
demonstrated in the laboratory right now. 
Luckily, because it’s not a big target, there are 
not too many out there on the road, actors 
have not spent time doing this. And there are 
no sufficient defenses today. 
David Atkinson:  One day someone will publish a new attack. 
Another day, the following week, there is a 
defense. It is an arms race. This is not my area, 
but it really makes me wonder how many 
companies, including automotive, are going to 
address these unique new challenges. 
 So what is the impact? Well, I mean, 
degradation of performance, failure, privacy 
breach. What if they hack and get a view of the 
camera inside your car? Yes, there are cameras 
inside your car for lots of reasons that we could 
talk about. Worst case: they subvert control. 
Now they are driving. This has been 
demonstrated already. Without the AI, we can 
already subvert vehicles. You could use it as a 
computing platform. You can use it as a 
stepping stone for other attacks just because 
it’s connected to other cars and to the 
infrastructure. And worst case: mischief or 
physical attack. 
David Atkinson:  Last week, we saw Baltimore traffic grind to a 
halt because a gasoline tanker overturned at a 
critical intersection. That was, of course, 
human involved and not automation involved. 
But let’s say it wasn’t. Now, it took them twelve 
hours to fix that up. And a bad actor might 
now go to another intersection and crash 
another one, and then another one. Or you can 
imagine a truck driving up on a sidewalk in a 
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crowded city. There’s lots of ways that this 
could go bad, and that is what needs attention. 
Thank you very much. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Thank you. Then we’re going to hear now from 
Professor Wagner with some really fascinating 
stuff. 
 
Alan Wagner:  Thank you! Yeah. I think I will be much more 
brief. My name is Alan Wagner. I do 
technology of science engineering, and really 
trying to build these systems focusing on real 
world ecology, valid types of experimental 
systems and robots. And so, one example of 
one area that I’m very interested in is 
developing robots, and it is a robot here that 
we named Emergie. 
   It’s an emergency evacuation robot. Maybe it 
might looks like something that you would 
want to pull the arms on like a slot machine. 
But, nevertheless, I am trying to have these 
things show up at your door. Even if you’ve 
never interacted with a robot before. It is 
seeing whether or not different types of people 
will follow these types of robots in high stress, 
high impact, high physical risk environments. 
We believe that there is a lot of value to doing 
this; ideally to reduce response time and have 
something that could work in schools, 
hospitals, any type of environment to get 
people out as quickly as possible. 
Alan Wagner:  We ran experiments doing this. They have 
talked about them all over, and we want to see 
whether or not people would follow these 
types of things. We found that basically, 
everybody will follow them. All the people we 
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tested, no matter even if we told them the 
robot was broken, they would follow it. And 
so, this sort of shows the automation bias, and 
the fact that people have a tendency to default 
to believing that the technology is right even 
when it’s behaving in ways that you know it 
probably shouldn’t. 
Alan Wagner:  In related conversations with the military, I 
have spoken with fighter pilots. When we 
talked to them about the possibility of using 
drones in warfare, and one of their concerns 
was, “What if this thing malfunctions? Will I 
have to put myself at risk to try to save it?” And 
these are sort of the things that come up in real 
world environments as well. 
 We are also doing some other work, but the 
goal of this project is develop robots that could 
interact and learn how to play a game from a 
child, and play the game the way the child 
wants them to and wants to teach the robot. 
Part of the advantage, again, is that the robot 
could actually adapt its behavior to the 
variations and local variations of the way the 
child wants to play. But it also provides a fertile 
ground for really human robot interaction 
questions such as having common ground, 
which is sort of a shared interactive experience, 
and involving methods for having the robot 
ask relevant questions that a child would 
understand. And then, using those answers to 
sort of build a structure of the game. 
Alan Wagner:  We are also looking at some ways for machine 
ethics frameworks, how can autonomous 
systems decide what is right and what is wrong 
using different frameworks such as 
utilitarianism, Kantianism, and having the 
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machine try to determine what the trade-off is 
when you have two frameworks trying to do 
different things. Autonomous driving, for 
example, which Dave was talking about. 
Alan Wagner:  For example, I moved here from Atlanta a 
couple years ago. And in Atlanta (downtown 
Atlanta), the speed limit is 55 miles an hour, 
but everyone drives at about 70 to 75 miles an 
hour. So it is an autonomous system. It has to 
sort of answer this question: should I follow 
the rules and drive the speed limit? Or should 
I do what might be safer for everyone and drive 
as fast as everyone else? This is a very 
challenging system, or a very challenging 
question for an autonomous system to answer, 
or the people that write the code for it. 
  If you are Google, or whatever company, you 
do not want to program in a code that says, 
“Break the speed limits,” even if that may be 
what is safer in the long run. So, we are looking 
at architectures that may allow these types of 
systems to kind of consider a broader 
contextual framework. 
Alan Wagner:  Finally, an even more strange and extreme kind 
of project, we are looking at what happens 
when an autonomous system tries to enforce 
norms. What happens when an autonomous 
system actually punishes people, and physically 
punishes? We are looking at this. But we have 
an exoskeleton that we have built, and this 
exoskeleton is specifically built to a lock to 
prevent someone from doing something. Part 
of our hypothesis is that, people actually prefer 
to be punished by an autonomous machine 
than they would have human because these 
autonomous machines do not judge. They 
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don’t emotionally make you feel bad. They just 
meter out the punishment. So this is one thing 
that we are looking at, and I think I will end 
with that. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  How did legal counsel feel about exoskeletons 
that punish? 
 
Alan Wagner:  We have our own internal review. They are 
fully aware there . . . 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Did internal review approve this? I just want to 
check the law. 
 
Alan Wagner:   Nobody will get hurt. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:   Thank you. Thank you. 
 
Alan Wagner:  My department head is here. I can see if she is 
frightened right now. 
[From Audience]:  I’m terrified. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Okay, her palms are sweating, but then no 
problem. No, so in terms of hearing those, that 
is really real research going on right now here 
at Penn State. And that is very cool to get. Just 
to see this actual research that is going and then 
in societal goals that you are attempting to use 
autonomous systems for, in emergency 
situations and rescue situations. And that 
adaptability piece is so fascinating. 
 
Alan Wagner:   Yes. 
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Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  All of those human factors have to come in, so 
I think it is going to be really interesting now 
to turn it over to the Major and talk about this. 
But if you can just give us that hands-on 
understanding of how the Pennsylvania State 
Police are using AI and autonomous systems 
right now, and where you see its benefits and 
where you see its constitutional concerns. 
 
Douglas Burig:  Thanks. There is no question that artificial 
intelligence and autonomous systems are 
having a significant impact on what we are 
doing in law enforcement today. In my view, 
mostly a positive impact. 
 It is changing at a rate that I have not seen 
anywhere in my twenty-five-year career to this 
point. But I think the challenge for us is to 
continually innovate, to embrace these new 
technologies to see how they fit into our world. 
But also, respect and protect peoples’ privacy, 
civil rights and civil liberties while we are doing 
it. I find that the change in technology is 
sometimes outpacing what the courts can help 
us decide, or any policy that is set or any laws 
that are passed to help govern this, which I 
know Marc on the end is going to talk about a 
little more. 
Douglas Burig:  Just one of the technologies I will talk about 
today, just to give you some real-world 
examples of how is this benefiting you. How is 
it helping to protect you and your families on a 
daily basis? But we are having a tremendous 
amount of success with facial recognition 
technology. The same type of technology I 
used to get through the encryption of my 
laptop this morning just by looking at it, that 
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you log into your phone or you tag your friends 
on Facebook with is solving crimes every single 
day. 
Doug Burig:  Fifty years ago, because we know offenders are 
largely recidivists, we would take bookings, 
arrest photos, and show them the victims of 
violent crime to go through them, to search 
through it, and pick out the person who 
committed that crime. Now, this intelligence, 
this artificial intelligence can comb through 
twenty million drivers’ license photos and three 
million arrest photos in three or four seconds. 
I mean, just think about the power that it has 
today. 
 Just a couple of real-world examples, and these 
are recent. First of all, this is one of the caveats 
with facial recognition: it is not discriminative 
enough to be considered identification. It is not 
fingerprints. It is not DNA. There is a 
disclaimer when you log into the system that 
tells everybody that is using it that. So I don’t 
want anyone to think that it is definitively the 
person when this query comes back. And we 
do not treat it that way. If we were to use that 
in evidence, as probable cause for a search 
warrant, it would become fruits from a 
poisonous tree, and we would have no 
foundation. So, we do not do that with this 
technology. 
Douglas Burig:  Also, it does not have to be a head on shot. The 
technology is now 2D. When I first started this, 
it had to be a pretty much a head-on shot. Now 
if the head turns the side, it can interpret with 
the data points and look on the other, and fill 
it in. Of course, it is a lot less accurate that way, 
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but just in the last couple of years, this has 
changed dramatically. 
Douglas Burig:  This is a case from four weeks ago. This is a 
homicide in the eastern part of Pennsylvania. It 
is still an ongoing case, so I cannot say a whole 
lot about it. But a young man was killed and a 
witness was able to give a nickname for the 
individual, and a possible spot on Instagram to 
look for them. That is all they had, and that is 
the actual photo that was given. Obviously, the 
center part of their face is blacked out. 
 How long would this have taken trying to get 
an image out in the greater Philadelphia area to 
identify this person? But our analyst sitting in 
her cubicle in Harrisburg, in thirty seconds was 
able to get a hit—what we would call a hit—on 
this image for this individual. So, that is an 
arrest booking photo from two years before. 
  Now, once they started layering in, and that is 
really what makes it valuable in law 
enforcement. We started layering in the other 
data sources that we have, look at the criminal 
history, and where does this person live. It 
became apparent very quickly that this was 
likely the suspect. This is transmitted to the 
investigators, and through the independent 
investigation, and eventually witness 
identification. This is the person, and he’s 
currently awaiting trial for homicide. 
Douglas Burig:  This is another one. Unfortunately, a young 
woman was raped. This was North Central 
Pennsylvania. This is November of 2018. She 
did not know her attacker’s name, only knew a 
nickname, and there had been some 
conversation back and forth on a social media 
platform. So this image was sent into our 
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analysts who ran it through, and that is an 
Instagram photo. Again, within about two 
minutes, they were able to identify this person 
or get what we would call a hit. A strong 
correlation that it is likely the individual. 
Douglas Burig:  It is interesting. When you see the returns 
come back, you will see both males and females 
because it is only looking at jaw angles, and 
distance between your eyes, and things like 
that. So, you will see both males and females 
come back. Sometimes you will see the person 
wearing the same clothing that they wore in 
their driver’s license photo while committing 
the crime. Or there will be a very distinctive 
image. A tattoo that is visible on their neck 
where you don’t have to be an expert or a 
scientist to figure out that that is probably the 
individual. Layer the other data sources onto it 
and get it out to the people that are doing the 
case. 
 How long, again, would it have taken to 
identify this person through social media or 
through banging on and just becoming part of 
the daily news cycle? So, this is something that, 
when I started law enforcement, we could only 
dream of. 
Douglas Burig:  On the national security side, this is a case the 
FBI was working on. An international 
terrorism suspect that had social media 
presence in both a foreign country and in the 
United States. They did not know who this 
individual was. The case is going for quite some 
time. The agent sent it in to us, and we were 
able to identify the main target and three 
accomplices. This is somebody that was 
planning with other terrorists to do harm to the 
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United States, yet it was in a Pennsylvania 
database that helped bring together this 
international terrorism case. 
Douglas Burig:  It also shows the value of sharing information, 
and working collectively with all of our 
partners. Something that we learned well 
before 9/11, but was certainly made 
increasingly apparent after that horrible event. 
 I just want to talk briefly about some of the 
protection. So we have access to all this 
information. We have your social security 
numbers. We have access to an incredible 
amount of data that we are entrusted with. So, 
how do we protect that? How do we ensure 
that it is not misused? 
 We are very cognizant every single day that one 
misuse of this type of technology can result in 
it being taken away, and we would not be able 
to get justice for other victims in future cases. 
So we are very, very cognizant of that. We 
don’t wield this lightly. I hear analysts and our 
investigators talking constantly about how 
much can we collect on this? Should we share 
this? Who can we share this with? And that is 
where we want to be in law enforcement. But 
this includes the collection, the use, the 
analysis, retention, destruction, sharing, and 
dissemination of protected data on all fronts. 
Douglas Burig:  First of all, the training component. Nobody 
has access to the systems without extensive 
training, without non-disclosure agreements, 
without regular training. This includes both the 
state statutes, which for criminal justice 
information in our state is 9102, 9106 and Title 
18. And the federal regulations 28 CFR, Part 
23, which I just took my annual training on two 
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weeks ago. Even at my level, I still do it every 
year. I spend the three hours because I oversee 
the program. That is how seriously we take it. 
Douglas Burig:  Restricted access. All these systems are closed. 
I think you have heard from the panelists 
today, there is no system that can’t be 
penetrated. However, I haven’t seen it on UC 
systems that I am talking about today. They 
have to meet pretty rigorous FBI CJIS 
standards, which is criminal justice information 
sharing systems. So they are defended about as 
well as it possibly could be. 
 They also have really extensive audit trails. In 
our intelligence system, it is searchable to the 
keystroke. There are audits that are done by 
outside people that don’t have a vested interest 
in the Pennsylvania State Police, as well as 
internal audit controls with mandatory 
numbers of inquiries that you would have to be 
at to look. 
 Do people abuse the systems or misuse them? 
Unfortunately, that has happened. But many of 
our people are not short timers. They are in this 
for a career, typically. And the penalties include 
suspension and termination, and I have seen 
both for misuse of UC system. So, we take this 
very seriously. 
Douglas Burig:  Also, with our privacy policy, we are very 
transparent. It is available on the state police 
website, and we have a privacy attorney 
embedded in our function with a top-secret 
security clearance who has a backdoor, all-
access pass to everything that is going on. We 
often speak to her during different aspects of 
the collection or dissemination of information 
to get her insight, and she has the right legal 
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acumen to be able to do this. This is not 
somebody we call the privacy officer. It is a 
highly qualified individual, and I know our 
federal partners operate the same way. 
Douglas Burig:  But I hope that gives you a little better view, 
and we could talk endlessly about the other 
autonomous systems, UAVs, drones. The state 
police just got into that technology. Just 
purchased it. We took a little bit longer than 
other agencies to get to that point because we 
want to be very deliberate. 
 Just for example, the last helicopter we 
purchased was $8.5 million. The drones we 
bought this fall were $2,500. So, when you look 
at efficiencies and uses, and the capabilities are 
largely the same, especially if you are not in the 
medical transport business. This is something 
to think about. I don’t think we will have a fleet 
of helicopters ten or fifteen years from now. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Maybe, can you give them some examples of 
how UAVs will economize what you need to 
do across this big state? 
 
Douglas Burig:  Sure. Right now, we wanted to be conservative 
when we started with this program. So, they are 
being used for accident reconstruction. So 
normally we would shut down a road, impede 
travel and commerce for four or six hours at a 
time. The drones are doing fly-overs. They are 
doing several million data points, and usually in 
about thirty minutes. From a lot of different 
angles, we get all of the measurements that we 
need and the road gets opened sooner. We are 
also using it for a crime scene reconstruction. 
We can get all the distance from the victim, 
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from shell casings, and capture everything—
any weather in a matter of moments. We are 
also using them in the search and rescue aspect 
of things. Certainly, a lot quicker to get them 
up. 
Douglas Burig:  Also, in the special emergency response team, 
we already have an exigent circumstance 
around somebody’s property for shots fired, 
for a barricaded gunman situation, and why 
risk tactical members to go up to the window 
and see if the person is lying in wait for those 
officers? Or if he took his own life a half hour 
ago, and they are flying up to these windows, 
sending information real-time and out to 
people on the scene that have to make 
decisions. 
 We saw in Georgia overnight; two police 
officers were shot trying to enter a house. A 
hostage situation. Three people were killed. I 
see a day where there will not be live police 
officers, and I think my panelists would 
probably agree, we will not be entering these 
situations. It will all be autonomous vehicles 
taking the risk. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Thank you very much, Major. We have really 
heard the broader concepts from Dr. Atkinson, 
and Professor Wagner’s research, and I am 
excited to turn this back to someone who 
comes to us both from the technology 
standpoint with the experienced research you 
have done, and you are in the thick of law 
school. 
 
Marc Canellas: Yeah. I mean, it is wonderful to follow Doug, 
especially someone who wants to go into 
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criminal law. But on the defense side and has a 
slightly different perspective. 
Marc Canellas: Yeah. No, but this is exactly the type of 
conversations I think we need to be having. 
That there are cases where this technology has 
been used, is being used and actually has some 
real promise. I am going to have a slightly 
different take though. 
 I was trained in graduate school by Amy 
Pritchett, along with one of her students, my 
PhD advisor, Karen Feigh. And my training 
was essentially, as someone brought up the 
Boeing 737 MAX 8, our job was to make sure 
the Boeing 737 MAX 8 would never have 
happened. The interaction between the pilot 
and the autopilot should never have become a 
situation where it crashed into the ground. So 
that is a very stark reminder of me of why I 
went to law school, is to make sure bad things 
like that don’t happen. 
 Coming from my background, I’m trying to 
combine all of this and talk about challenges 
and steps forward. The first one—and these 
are five general thoughts that I have that are 
hopefully somewhat provoking—give people 
some thought. The first is that “Our wars are 
all intertwined.” The war on terror, war on 
drugs, war on crime. They share the same 
technology, tactics and failures. 
Marc Canellas: I mean that to say that, especially at NYU 
where I am, there’s the international law 
people, and then there’s the criminal law 
people, and there’s the IP and technology law 
people, and these are all together. There may 
be domains where they are applied, but the 
tactics are being shared, the technology is being 
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shared, and the failures translate as well. Even 
the metaphor, the war metaphor, translates as 
well. 
Marc Canellas: And so, we must look at how these 
technologies are being deployed, outside of 
things like accidents and crime scene 
reconstruction. You have drones that were 
developed for the military but used to surveil 
Freddie Gray protests in Baltimore. You have 
stingrays which simulate cell towers that were 
developed for military purposes, then DHS 
licensed them out to police forces, and now 
they’re being used for domestic criminal 
investigations. 
 You have advanced cyber and surveillance 
techniques developed for the military, but then 
unconstitutionally used against Muslim 
populations by the NYPD. So, there are ways 
that, not particularly-good-faith actors can use 
these technologies against populations. And so 
all the concerns about discrimination, disparate 
effects on minority populations, and 
criminalization of poverty, are influenced by 
the technology developed in the international 
scene. If you think about autonomous 
weapons abroad, I hope we think, at some 
point, about what happens when we arm 
drones— what happens when we arm robots 
in America? When you come face to face with 
one? I would prefer a police officer. That is my 
preference, but I think that’s a conversation we 
have to have. 
Marc Canellas: Second, “technology is not neutral.” This is my 
sort of slightly Southern coming through. It 
ain’t magic, and it certainly is not our savior. 
It’s not neutral. So even normative technology 
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built with the best intentions can be used in bad 
ways by people acting in bad faith. Body 
cameras were supported by the NYPD and 
even the ACLU for use in New York City. The 
idea was that was going to bring accountability. 
Marc Canellas: But they did not realize its other potential. 
There is a recent case just a few days ago, where 
the NYPD settled the suit, where they had 
edited videos to make it seem like they had the 
warrant before they entered someone’s 
apartment when, actually, they had flipped the 
order of the video. So actually, they had 
entered, already left, got the warrant, re-
entered, but edited the video to make it seem 
like it was the other way around. So, when you 
control the video of body cameras, if it’s not 
governed correctly, if there’s not enough 
safeguards in place, it can be used in bad ways. 
 Magic has already been talked about. Patrick 
and Mike talked about this earlier. This is 
advanced technology. It is. And it’s certainly 
complicated and may have some emerging 
properties, but it’s not magic. It’s also not our 
savior, and I’ll leave this to Noreen, the 
theologian, who will be talking in the next 
panel. We cannot think of technology as the 
only solution to our problems. That if only we 
could use AI to filter out things like extreme 
content, if only we had robots that could do all 
the dirty, dull law enforcement work, we would 
be better off. 
Marc Canellas: The minute we call it magic or deem it a savior, 
and appeal to these higher powers where we 
are abdicating control and responsibility for 
our own actions and our own responsibilities 
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as people in a democratic society. And I think 
we have to hold that together. 
Marc Canellas: Third, “law and policy are designed to be slow, 
methodical and backwards looking.” I’ve used 
the word design there very deliberately. They 
were meant to be this way. When people 
founded it, that was the goal. When law was 
developed, precedence was the goal. And so 
. . . Huh? 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:   You’re good. 
 
Marc Canellas: No, no. I want to make sure because the 
question and discussion is going to be the most 
interesting part. So, I hesitate to go down this 
direction when I have an immense privacy and 
a wiretapping scholar next to me. 
 But I think about the Carpenter case from 
2018, which is, I think, a very useful example. 
Hopefully, I get the story right. Otherwise, I 
will get graded. Let’s say you’re arrested for 
robbery, and the critical information that was 
used to identify you, placing you at the scene, 
was gathered by police who accessed your 
physical location through phone records. 
You’re convicted, but you’re really upset. 
You’re saying, “There’s no way this can be 
constitutional.” You think it violates your 
Fourth Amendment right against warrantless 
search against and seizure. So, you appeal. The 
problem is, laws are based on precedents. 
Marc Canellas: For many years, there’s been something called 
the third-party doctrine, where the minute you 
gave up your information to a third party, it 
was no longer yours to be protected against. 
But in 2018, the Carpenter decision said that 
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actually, there are certain ways that you are 
protected against this third-party doctrine. You 
may be very happy you won. But this has been 
going on for twenty plus years, the law is not 
proactive. Only when things go wrong, Only 
when there’s been enough time to get it out 
into the general public that certain things are 
going on do we really see the law actually react. 
It is not proactive. 
Marc Canellas: Maybe you say, “Oh, I’m going to go to 
Congress. Congress will listen to me.” I have 
lots of thoughts about that, obviously, given 
my time there. But the problem is, Congress’s 
primary job is also not to pass legislation. So, 
they’re doing their job really well in some ways 
at the moment. 
 But their job, the first thing I was told when I 
worked there was, “Our job is not to pass good 
legislation. Our job is to stop bad legislation.” 
The entire process is built around the battles, 
of people coming together, forcing laws into 
action only when everyone can agree that this 
is the right way to go. So, these are deliberate 
bodies, whether it be law or government, that 
are meant to go slowly. 
 As you think about the pace of technology, it 
is inherently outpacing law and government. 
We have to decide as people what we want to 
do about that. Whether it’s the stories we tell 
ourselves. Whether it’s the engineers coming 
together and saying, “We need to self-regulate 
and establish standards.” Whether it’s lawyers 
coming to the fore. Whether it’s police 
agencies saying, “We’re going to do this the 
right way, even though there’s no law against 
it.” So, we have to take control of it. 
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Marc Canellas: The fourth one’s a little cryptic, “the oracle has 
been poisoned.” This was when I worked on 
the Hill in 2017 to 2018. I worked a lot on 
election security. There were reports that the 
Russian Internet Research Agency, which 
helped do some of the cyber-attacks on our 
electronically-influenced campaigns, they 
called it “poisoning the oracle.” What they 
meant was that elections are actually based on 
trust. 
 Elections are based on trust. It’s not to 
convince the winner they won. The winner 
always thinks they won. It’s to convince the 
losers that they lost. So it’s about trust. It’s 
about trusting the process, trusting that people 
got their vote counted correctly. 
 If you can convince people that their votes 
were not counted correctly. If you can 
convince people that there are nefarious actors, 
deep state, fake news, rigged elections—
however you want to describe it—you can 
undermine, even if you did not hack. Even if 
you did not actually get in there and change any 
votes, you’ve already destabilized it. 
Marc Canellas: And so, this idea of trust, which is why I know 
a lot of what Alan does. Trust is inherently 
critical to a lot of our general governing of our 
society. And you can poison the oracle if you 
can use things like deep fakes. So, you’re 
recording video, you can create alternate video 
making the President or anyone you want say 
the things you want and have a video. That will 
spread like fire across the Internet. You look at 
India and Pakistan recently with their 
information warfare, and reality does not 
matter. If we live in a world where reality does 
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not matter, everything starts to break down. 
And AI is only going to increase that capability. 
Marc Canellas: Adversarial AI is another one of those things 
where you can actually make an algorithm, by 
attacking the data that it’s built upon, 
characterize things wrong. Characterize threats 
when there’s not a threat, and characterize 
certain people as a threat when they are not. 
That’s going to be a problem. 
 All of this to say the last point. I put it in bold 
for a reason. “People are the beginning and 
the end of everything.” They are the only 
reason we care about things like autonomous 
weapons, things like autonomous vehicles. 
Yes, there’s efficiency, there’s money to be 
made. But we care about the people’s lives that 
are at stake. We care when and how people are 
killed. We care about the safety of people. 
That’s something we can’t forget. That’s what 
I learned from my lab down at Georgia Tech. 
 If you don’t understand the humans involved, 
their lives, their needs, their wishes, these 
minority populations, these criminalized 
groups. If you do not understand and you don’t 
go out to reach them, you will never succeed. 
Marc Canellas: I just want to close and say, the hard questions 
are not going to be technology questions. The 
technology is sitting up here. The technologists 
sitting there are brilliant. They’re going to 
continue to do amazing things, I have no doubt 
about that. The questions is: what do we want 
them to do? 
 I love this discussion of storytelling. What 
stories are we going to tell ourselves about the 
future we want? What are the norms we’re 
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going to set? If we don’t have that, then how 
can we possibly ask Congress or the law to 
reflect our will when we don’t even know what 
our will is? And so, I think there are good ways 
to do it, but I implore you to start with the 
humans. Start with us. Thank you. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Alright, so we can take questions. But I am 
going to go ahead and just ask questions for the 
group. So, if you know you have a question that 
you want to ask, please feel free to get up and 
come to the mics. 
 
 I’m just finishing up and really setting the 
broader question. How do we handle this from 
a legislative and policy standpoint? 
 We see very different approaches, both with 
your Europe’s EU’s GDPR, General Data 
Protection Regulation, there’s very different 
approach to data and use of data, including use 
of data by algorithms because it’s all humans 
that are doing this and driving this. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  In the U.S., how is that playing out? And what 
I tried to set that stage for, and I think you’ve 
gotten a little of this, is that we have this really 
kind of disjointed approach to managing 
autonomous systems because they fall in 
different categories. So, they’re regulated by 
different institutions and agencies. So, these are 
some of the broader questions I know we think 
about. I see that we’ve some people up here.  
 
Audience:  Thank you for that very interesting discussion. 
My question has two parts, sorry about it. It’s 
mostly directed to Marc because you talked 
2020                    Autonomous Systems & Domestic Security Symposium Issue 
187 
about Carpenter, but anybody can answer it. Do 
you think third party doctrine in this new era 
of technology still a viable doctrine? Or do you 
think we should throw it away? 
Audience: The second part is, and probably anybody can 
answer this. Do you think our expectation of 
privacy decreases as the technology rolls? Or it 
stays the same, or even increases? Because we 
have signed a lot of privacy policies and so on. 
Alan Wagner:  I will defer to the leading scholar on things like 
that, and then I can address the second part. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  Okay, so, I’ll go with the first part. Just so 
everybody in the room who are non-lawyers 
understands that third-party doctrine states in 
law, that if you share something with someone 
else, you can’t really claim that you have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  The problem with third-party doctrine is that it 
was passed in cases, precedents that occurred 
long before the Internet existed. And so that 
idea was, of course, if I’m sharing something 
with David sitting next to me, how can I say I 
have a right to privacy in it? As technology 
changes, the platforms evolve. Every single 
thing you do online, everything you do in our 
society is necessarily shared with a third party: 
the companies, the platforms that are operating 
these technologies. 
 
 So, in Carpenter, the Supreme Court very 
deliberately said, it is clear that we got 
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indicators in earlier cases, in USP Jones, Judge 
Sotomayor said it’s clear the third-party 
doctrine is not working here. But very clearly 
in Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts made it and, 
“Hey, this third-party doctrine is not working. 
We can’t say just because we shared something 
with someone using technology that we no 
longer have a right to privacy.” 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna: Remember, the piece of that, though, that’s 
important in all of these conversations is: 
there’s a massive distinction in the application 
of law here. Private companies are not bound 
or restricted by the First Amendment or the 
Fourth Amendment. Only the United States, 
only federal law enforcement, only the 
government is restricted. So everything, that’s 
the data aggregation that’s occurring, that’s 
part of our problem. We don’t have parallel 
privacy standards or parallel privacy law to 
regulate what industry does versus what 
government does. 
 
Marc Canellas:  Yeah, and I would say to the question, I think 
it’s our changing expectations of privacy. We 
have quite a range of demographics in the 
audience. I’m sure by generation we have 
different expectations of privacy. The one I 
always come back to is convenience. 
Marc Canellas: If you can make something convenient where 
I don’t have to pay, I’ll give you all my data. 
You make it convenient for me to reach out 
and connect with family. Facebook sounds 
great, even when people know what’s going on 
in the systems. All this stuff with Facebook and 
Twitter, whoever you want to pick out, people 
still use it, because how else am I supposed to 
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connect with all these people? So I think the 
amount of convenience and in that trade off, I 
think people are happy to give away that 
convenience. But I think it’s also because they 
have a new expectation of privacy. 
Marc Canellas:  It’s not that they don’t know they’re giving up 
the data to a third party. It’s that I trust that you 
will be good with that data. I don’t know what 
good means in that sense. But I think a lot of 
us when we’re giving up data to some of these 
companies or even to our universities, where 
there have been lots of breaches, we’re 
assuming that they’re acting in good faith. And 
I think the key, as was just mentioned, is that, 
commercial companies don’t have to have 
good faith necessarily. And that’s the change. 
Anne Toomey 
McKenna:  I do think part of it, though, is that consumers 
do not understand the amount of data that is 
aggregated about them individually. That just 
millions of data points that are aggregated 
about each of us sitting in this room, whether 
we are users or not of the platforms, somebody 
we know is. Every person in this room has a 
genetic profile that’s probably being captured 
by 23andMe, and the like, because somebody 
you know did it. It doesn’t matter if you did it 
or not. 
 
  I think that part of it is a lack of understanding 
in terms of what really is being given over for 
the convenience. 
 
Marc Canellas:   Yeah. 
Audience:  I have a question that speaks to what a few of 
you talked about, which is—it has to do with 
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the atrophying of our skills based on our 
reliance on technology. David, you talked 
about the possibility of having a car that you 
could just tell to engage in parallel parking. Of 
course, parallel parking, which is notoriously 
difficult, requires all sorts of skills that we been 
a long-time honing, and a lot more time honing 
before we had power steering. 
Audience:  Before I could just look up phone numbers on 
my smartphone—or my phone is storing most 
of the numbers that I ever used—I had 
memorized hundreds of phone numbers and, 
actually, there are all sorts of therapies that 
require kids to memorize numbers and recite 
them backwards, and so on. So, we’re losing 
the skills. Already they find that they have a 
grave difficulty having adequate surgeons and 
training surgeons because our fine motor skills 
are starting to atrophy so much. 
 Alan, you talked about people being willing to 
follow these emergency guided robots. Now, 
that reliance on technology then has a feedback 
loop, because the skills that you would use to 
guide yourself in emergency will start to 
atrophy, because we’re so willing to follow 
technology. Personally, I refuse to follow my 
ways about, maybe a third of the time, because 
it’s wrong so often. But if it got more accurate, 
I’m sure I would follow it. 
David Atkinson:  I think there’s no question that we lose skills. 
How many people know how to build a fire in 
the woods with wet wood? Oh my gosh, okay. 
I’m shocked. Okay, bad example. But the point 
is, this is the history of technology. We don’t 
build fires in California. 
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 The history of technology is giving up some 
things. Okay, how many people know how to 
shoe a horse? Okay, fewer good. Better 
example. That used to be a real important skill. 
It’s not anymore, and life has moved on and 
there are alternate ways of getting the function 
of mobility done. And so, I think we’ve 
sacrificed a lot of skills. And the question is, 
we’re not actually being conscious of the fact 
that we’re shifting like that. 
David Atkinson:  My kids can’t use a map very well at all. Their 
entire world is based on point-to-point. I get 
into my car here, and I follow the line on the 
road, and then the phone tells me to follow. 
And they just don’t have the spatial context 
anymore. 
Audience:  Do we have a grip on how this is affecting our 
brain development, on how this is affecting our 
evolution as a species? I mean, I think we don’t 
take these costs seriously enough. It’s not just, 
“well, I don’t need to shoe a horse anymore. 
So, never mind, I don’t have to worry about 
that.” These skills really are critical for 
development at all stages of development with 
children and learning. 
Alan Wagner:  There is research showing and more recently 
showing drops in empathy with younger 
generation—specifically, people that grew up 
with cell phones—lack of emotion recognition, 
emotion understanding, nonverbal behavior. 
These types of things. This all sort of shows a 
very age-based curve which mimics, to some 
extent, cell phone usage. 
Alan Wagner:  We see that these things do impact people. 
There’s especially more recent results that 
show that children under the age of two or 
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three that spend more than an hour on a phone 
or any kind of device, lose language ability 
pretty quickly. And that length, lost language 
ability doesn’t come back very quickly. So this 
is not necessarily permanent, but it is certainly 
sort of delayed development with regard to 
these technologies. 
Alan Wagner: So, you can wonder how the sort of humanoid 
robot taking care of a child might impact them 
if a cell phone is already impacting them. 
Audience:  Sure. So this is actually a good segue into 
things. My point is that, what I’ve been hearing 
is sort of anecdotes, and you pick up the 
elephant and you say, “This part doesn’t look 
good.” There was a comment which says, the 
audacity or something like that of human 
beings to think that an automated plane could 
fly. I think there is a reverse audacity in 
thinking that you could actually beat a 
computer in chess. 
 The point is not to pick individual pieces that 
we say, we can find out several examples where 
it’s bad, we can find out several examples 
where it’s actually saved thousands of lives. 
The thing to do, perhaps, is to get a total 
evaluation, a more realistic evaluation with 
projections, and then have a conversation. So, 
is the conversation getting just primarily 
focused on what we want to see? And should 
we move on to a bigger picture overall 
evaluation? 
David Atkinson:  No, take a seat. There is a mindset that persists 
that says, we’re going to put the human at the 
center of things and consider the systems and 
the technology around the human. But as our 
machines get increasingly intelligent, as they 
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communicate with us and ever more natural 
ways, as they gain greater ability to manipulate, 
they’re going to become more like partners and 
less like tools. And we have to ask the question, 
what is the combination of a person and a 
machine together as two cognitive entities in 
this larger system? What is the capability of that 
larger system? And stop thinking about just the 
human and augmentation is a partnership. 
David Atkinson:  That may be far out, but that’s the vector. 
That’s the direction we’re going. And so this is 
a very good question, and thinking of things in 
that system context. 
Marc Canellas:  If I may, just briefly, to bring up something like 
the Boeing accident, or autonomous vehicles, 
or I think even like the face recognition 
systems is exactly this. A lot of automated 
systems are not designed even accounting for 
the human at all. It’s, “I can do this cool thing. 
I can deploy it really fast. I’m going to take the 
market. This is going to be great.” Not, “how 
can I design a good team mate?” 
 As we talk about in chess or driving, and I’m 
sure a lot of the tools that are used by the 
police. How can we work to together using 
both of our skills, and both our checks and 
balances on each other to make sure we’re both 
operating effectively? 
  I think if you approach it from that mindset – 
not as one has to be better than the other and 
replace or substitute – but teammates. That is 
the way to go about it. Unfortunately, I think 
that’s often not the way it’s gone about. 
Anne Toomey 
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McKenna:  I think, I mean, the major gave us an example 
of that’s how Pennsylvania State Police are 
using facial recognition. So very, like, it’s a 
team-based approach to the use of not just the 
technology as this is the person, and the 
technology is providing maybe more secure 
responses than an eyewitness potentially could 
at the get go. That combination of human 
investigation and technology. We’re out of 
time. 
